Mehri Madarshahi｜霍爾木茲海峽：伊朗的戰略重心所在

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導語：繼4月12日美伊在伊斯蘭堡的談判無果后，美國已于美國東部時間4月13日宣布對所有進出伊朗港口船只實施封鎖。美伊圍繞霍爾木茲海峽的博弈仍在持續。隨著戰事進入新階段，各方也在重新評估相關風險，調整政策應對。

在IPP榮譽教授梅赫里·馬達爾沙希看來，當前這場圍繞美國、以色列與伊朗展開的對抗，不僅僅是一場區域危機，而是一場嵌入更廣泛戰略體系的沖突，在這個體系中，區域戰爭、大國對抗和地緣經濟變化深深交織在一起。在這個不斷演變的框架內，中東已成為多種且往往相互競爭的戰略議程的匯合點。軍事行動、經濟脅迫、技術能力和有爭議的規范現在在同一個空間運作，并日益相互影響。然而，沖突并不能形成一個連貫的秩序構建。相反，它突顯了一個支離破碎的國際體系的不穩定性，在這個體系中，各國正在重新審視自己的弱點，重新定義自己的利益，并適應更具爭議的戰略格局。

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Strategic Center of Gravity

霍爾木茲海峽：伊朗的戰略重心所在

本文作者：Mehri Madarshahi（梅赫里·馬達爾沙希）

IPP榮譽教授、聯合國教科文組織下屬國際創意和可持續發展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會成員

引言：碎片化世界秩序中的多層次戰略體系

Introduction：A Fragmented World Order in a Multi-Layered Strategic System

當前中東沖突，尤其是圍繞伊朗、以色列、美國以及黎巴嫩等周邊地區行為體不斷演化的對抗，不能僅僅通過“局部升級”或“傳統國家間戰爭”的分析框架得到充分理解。它同樣也不能被簡單視為對一個原本穩定的全球秩序所進行的一場被動“壓力測試”。

The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, particularly the evolving confrontation involving Iran, Israel, the United States, and adjacent regional actors such as Lebanon, cannot be adequately understood through the analytical lenses of either localized escalation or conventional interstate war. Nor can it be reduced to a passive “stress test” of an otherwise stable global order.

本文認為，這場沖突實際上展開于一個多層次的戰略體系之中，在這一體系內，地區戰爭、大國競爭與地緣經濟重組彼此交織，并持續相互塑造。在這一框架下，中東不僅僅是一個動蕩地區，更是一個多重戰略項目相互匯聚的場域；多個行為體在軍事、經濟、技術與規范等不同維度上，圍繞部分彼此競爭的目標持續展開博弈。

This article argues instead that the conflict unfolds within a multi-layered strategic system in which regional warfare, great-power competition, and geoeconomic restructuring intersect and continuously shape one another. Within this framework, the Middle East is not merely a site of instability, but a convergent arena of overlapping strategic projects in which multiple actors pursue partially competing objectives across military, economic, technological, and normative domains.

除直接的戰場結果外，這場沖突至少還體現出四種彼此交互的戰略邏輯：

Beyond immediate battlefield outcomes, the conflict reflects at least four interacting strategic logics:

(1) 圍繞能源體系與戰略資源的影響力整合與爭奪；

(1) the consolidation and contestation of influence over energy systems and strategic resources;

(2) 對不斷演進的軍事技術——包括精確打擊體系和非對稱作戰體系——進行實戰測試與能力展示；

(2) the operational testing and demonstration of evolving military technologies, including precision-strike and asymmetric systems;

(3) 有關領土主權與軍事干預的法律和規范約束，正在逐步被侵蝕并被重新界定；

(3) the gradual erosion and redefinition of legal and normative constraints governing territoriality and intervention;

(4) 在一個日益由碎片化而非凝聚力所塑造的更廣泛全球秩序之中，圍繞地區陣營的競爭正變得更加突出。

(4) the implicit competition over regional alignment structures within a broader global order increasingly shaped by fragmentation rather than cohesion.

在這一結構之下，這場沖突并不體現某一種單一的戰略設計，也不體現某一種統一的霸權藍圖。相反，它反映出多種權力理性同時發生互動，這些理性分別作用于體系的不同層級，并產生遠遠超出該地區本身的累積性影響。

Within this configuration, the conflict does not express a singular strategic design or a unified hegemonic blueprint. Rather, it reflects the simultaneous interaction of multiple rationalities of power, each operating at different levels of the system and generating cumulative effects that extend far beyond the region itself.

其結果是，全球所處的環境中，冷戰后的秩序既未得到完整保留，也未被一種清晰的新秩序所取代。取而代之而浮現的，是一個碎片化的“中間時期”，其特征在于：霸權模式并不完整，治理邏輯彼此競爭，軍事能力、經濟影響力與被感知的戰略可靠性之間的分化不斷擴大。

The result is a global environment in which the post-Cold War order is neither fully intact nor clearly replaced. What emerges instead is a fragmented interregnum, characterized by incomplete hegemonic models, competing governance logics, and a widening divergence between military capability, economic influence, and perceived strategic reliability.

近期的發展進一步強化了這一判斷。在持續升級的局勢之下出現了2026年4月11日的高級別談判，隨后談判迅速破裂，并立即重新回到包括對關鍵能源咽喉通道發出威脅在內的破壞性行動（2026年4月13日），這表明，外交本身正日益嵌入沖突動態之中，而不再作為一種外部的穩定機制發揮作用。在這一語境下，談判與其說是通向解決的路徑，不如說是更廣泛戰略序列中的一種戰術工具，這也進一步凸顯了當代沖突所具有的多層次和非線性特征。

Recent developments reinforce this interpretation. The emergence of high-level negotiations (April 11, 2026) conducted under conditions of ongoing escalation, followed by their rapid breakdown and the immediate return to disruptive actions, including threats to critical energy chokepoints (April 13, 2026), suggests that diplomacy itself is increasingly embedded within the conflict dynamic rather than functioning as an external stabilizing mechanism. Negotiation, in this context, operates less as a pathway to resolution than as a tactical instrument within a broader strategic sequence, further underscoring the multilayered and non-linear character of contemporary conflict.

4月15日，相關海上交通數據顯示，仍有大批船只等待通過霍爾木茲海峽。圖源：BBC

碎片化體系中的權力角色互動

Interacting Power Roles in a Fragmented System

這場正在展開的沖突，并不是由某一占主導地位的大國塑造或任何一種穩定的國家等級制度所主導。相反，它揭示出一個體系，其主要行為體所施加的影響都是局部且往往彼此矛盾的：擁有軍事力量，卻缺乏經濟控制力；具備經濟中信地位，卻缺乏安全承諾；政治姿態鮮明，卻缺乏實際操作杠桿。

The unfolding conflict is not being shaped by a single dominant power, nor by a stable hierarchy of states. Rather, it reveals a system in which major actors operate with partial and often contradictory forms of influence: military strength without economic control, economic centrality without security commitment, or political positioning without operational leverage.

由此浮現出來的并不是一種協調有序的秩序，而是一個持續互動的場域：其中，一方行為體的每一步行動，都會重塑其他行為體所面臨的約束與機會。從這個意義上說，碎片化并不僅僅是一種預先存在的狀態，其本身就是這些互動作用的產物。

What emerges is not coordinated order, but a field of constant interaction in which every move by one actor reshapes the constraints and opportunities of others. Fragmentation, in this sense, is not simply a pre-existing condition. It is the product of these interactions.

在升級態勢的中心位置，美國和以色列仍然保持著明確的軍事優勢和行動主動權。它們通過力量投送、威懾以及定點打擊，力圖遏制伊朗并維持其地區主導地位。然而，這種軍事優勢并不能轉化為體系性控制。每一次升級都會帶來迅速超出戰場范圍的后果，擾亂能源市場，動搖盟友，并加深外交裂痕。

At the center of escalation, the United States and Israel retain clear military superiority and operational initiative. Through force projection, deterrence, and targeted strikes, they seek to contain Iran and preserve regional dominance. Yet this military advantage does not translate into systemic control. Each escalation produces consequences that quickly exceed the battlefield, disrupting energy markets, unsettling allies, and widening diplomatic fractures.

這種軍事控制與系統性后果之間的脫節，在外交領域正變得愈發明顯。即便在局勢持續升級之際仍在進行的高級別談判，也已不再發揮通向真正解決的路徑作用。相反，它們更像是戰略性間歇：是發出信號、重新調整位置或暫時停頓的時刻，而非能夠調和那些根本相悖目標的機制。

This slippage between military control and systemic consequence is increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena. High-level negotiations, conducted even as escalation continues, no longer function as genuine pathways to resolution. Instead, they appear as strategic interludes: moments of signaling, repositioning, or temporary pause rather than mechanisms capable of reconciling fundamentally incompatible objectives.

當升級態勢觸及全球經濟的基礎設施時，其更深層次的意義便會充分顯現出來。霍爾木茲海峽的不穩定，使一場地區性對抗轉化為一場全球經濟事件。這條狹窄的海上通道并不僅僅是一條運輸路線；它還是一個結構性節點，世界能源供應中相當大的一部分正是經由此處流動。一旦它變得不穩定，其影響便是立竿見影且波及深遠的。

The deeper significance of escalation becomes fully visible when it reaches the infrastructure of the global economy. The destabilization of the Strait of Hormuz transforms a regional confrontation into a global economic event. This narrow maritime corridor is not merely a transit route; it is a structural node through which a significant share of the world’s energy supply flows. Once it becomes unstable, the effects are immediate and far-reaching.

在這一背景下，權力已不僅僅通過軍事力量來施加，它同樣體現在擾亂流通的能力之中：轉移風險、抬高成本，并將不穩定性跨境傳導。伊朗盡管在軍事上相對處于劣勢，卻恰恰展現出了這種能力。

In this context, power is no longer exercised solely through military force, but also through the ability to disrupt circulation: to shift risks, raise costs, and transmit instability across borders. Iran, despite its relative military inferiority, has demonstrated precisely this capacity.

停泊在阿曼首都馬斯喀特的船只。圖源：新華社

伊朗：非對稱性力量、戰略杠桿與破壞邏輯

Iran: Asymmetric Power, Strategic Leverage, and the Logic of Disruption

如果說美國代表的是技術優勢，以色列代表的是精確威懾，那么伊朗所代表的則是另一種戰爭模式：非對稱的、經濟性的和體系性的。

If the United States represents technological superiority and Israel precision deterrence, then Iran represents a different model of warfare: asymmetric, economic, and systemic.

伊朗的戰略并不是為了在一場針對軍事上更強大力量的常規戰爭中取勝。它圍繞著一個更具可實現性的目標展開：把沖突成本提高到其對手在政治上或經濟上都無法承受的程度。

Iran’s strategy is not designed to win a conventional war against militarily superior powers. It is built around a more attainable objective: raising the cost of conflict to a level that its adversaries cannot politically or economically sustain.

從防御走向非對稱進攻

From Defense to Asymmetric Offense

隨著時間推移，尤其是自2025年至2026年局勢升級以來，伊朗已從一種以防御為主的姿態，轉向更具主動性的非對稱作戰理論。這一轉變主要體現在以下幾個方面：

Over time, and especially since the escalation of 2025–2026, Iran has moved from a largely defensive posture toward a more assertive asymmetric doctrine. This shift includes:

• 大規模使用彈道導彈和無人機；

• 在整個地區部署代理人網絡及合作性力量網絡；

• 將打擊目標從單純的軍事資產擴大到經濟與民用基礎設施。

• the use of ballistic missiles and drones in large volumes;

• the deployment of proxy and partner networks across the region;

• the targeting of economic and civilian infrastructure, not only military assets.

伊朗并未試圖完全阻止來襲打擊，而是著重于在承受破壞的同時保全報復能力，這種策略可被稱為“非對稱韌性”。這使其能夠在持續高壓下維持行動能力，并確保局勢始終保留進一步升級的可能。

Rather than attempting to block incoming attacks entirely, Iran has focused on absorbing damage while preserving retaliatory capability, a strategy that may be described as asymmetric endurance. This allows it to remain operational under sustained pressure and ensures that escalation always remains possible.

伊朗沙赫德無人機從卡車式支架上發射。圖源：伊斯蘭革命衛隊

霍爾木茲海峽：伊朗的戰略重心

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Strategic Center of Gravity

伊朗最強大的資產，是其地理位置。伊朗位處霍爾木茲海峽沿線，這使其具備將一場地區戰爭轉化為全球經濟危機的能力。伊朗并未謀求徹底封鎖海峽，而是采取了一種更為有效的策略：選擇性擾亂。

Iran’s most powerful asset is geography.Its position along the Strait of Hormuz gives it the ability to transform a regional war into a global economic crisis. Rather than seeking a full closure of the strait, Iran has adopted a more effective strategy: selective disruption.

這包括：

• 布設水雷行動；

• 使用無人機和快艇發動襲擾；

• 對商業航運實施騷擾與干擾。

This includes:

• mining operations;

• drone and fast-boat attack

• harassment of commercial shipping.

其目的并非實行全面封鎖，而是制造一種經過校準的不確定性：足以推高價格、擾亂供應鏈，并迫使全球予以關注。這由此形成了一種根本性的戰略不對稱。伊朗并不需要在軍事上擊敗美國；它所需要的，只是擾亂全球經濟。

The purpose is not total blockade, but calibrated uncertainty: enough to raise prices, unsettle supply chains, and compel global attention. This produces a fundamental strategic asymmetry. Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily; it only needs to disrupt the global economy.

4月9日伊朗國家安全委員會發布的霍爾木茲海峽分道通航方案。圖源：伊斯蘭革命衛隊

經濟戰作為“拉平差距”的手段

Economic Warfare as Equalizer

因此，伊朗已將戰場從領土范圍擴展到了全球市場。對海灣地區能源基礎設施和海上航線的擾動，會通過通貨膨脹、貿易、保險、航運以及金融穩定等領域產生連鎖反應。

Iran has thus expanded the battlefield beyond territory and into global markets. The disruption of Gulf energy infrastructure and maritime routes reverberates through inflation, trade, insurance, shipping, and financial stability.

這也正是伊朗戰略尤為有效之處。它能夠：

This is where Iran’s strategy becomes especially effective. It:

• 將壓力轉嫁給依賴進口的經濟體；

• 分化西方與非西方國家的應對；

• 對遠在該地區之外的行為體形成間接杠桿。

• shifts pressure onto import-dependent economies;

• divides Western and non-Western responses;

• creates indirect leverage over actors far beyond the region.

從這個意義上說，伊朗并不只是在打一場戰爭。它是在將相互依存武器化。其戰略并不依賴于戰場主導地位，而是依賴于其在能源市場、供應鏈和通脹動態等方面放大體系性壓力的能力。其結果是，一種不再受地理范圍所限、而是以結構性方式分布于全球體系之中的升級形態。

In this sense, Iran is not merely fighting a war. It is weaponizing interdependence. Its strategy does not depend on battlefield dominance, but on its capacity to amplify systemic pressure across energy markets, supply chains, and inflationary dynamics. The result is a form of escalation that is no longer geographically contained, but structurally distributed across the global system.

一種以生存而非勝利為目標的戰略

A Strategy of Survival, Not Victory

盡管擁有上述優勢，伊朗仍面臨嚴峻制約：經濟脆弱、制裁壓力、內部政治緊張，以及部分地區影響力網絡的弱化。即便如此，它也展現出相當的韌性。即使在屢遭打擊之后，其海上力量和非對稱作戰能力中的關鍵部分仍然保持完好。

Despite these advantages, Iran operates under serious constraints: economic fragility, sanctions pressure, internal political tensions, and the weakening of some regional influence networks. Yet it has also demonstrated resilience. Even after repeated strikes, key elements of its naval and asymmetric capabilities have remained intact.

這進一步印證了一個關鍵判斷：伊朗的目標是戰略生存與持續性擾亂的結合。隨著傳統能源通道趨于不穩定，全球市場也開始重新配置。替代性供應方，尤其是俄羅斯，因而獲得了出人意料的戰略分量。由于其出口通道較少受到霍爾木茲海峽局勢影響，再加上美國解除對俄制裁，俄羅斯能夠提供一種在危機時期愈發稀缺的東西：相對可靠性。這里的悖論十分清楚：一場本意在于削弱某一行為體的沖突，最終卻強化了其他行為體，而這種強化并非通過結盟實現，而是通過經濟機會在非預期中的再分配實現的。從這個意義上說，戰爭不僅會摧毀，也會重新分配。

This reinforces a critical point: Iran’s objective is not decisive victory, but strategic survival combined with sustained disruption.

As traditional energy routes become unstable, the global market begins to reconfigure itself. Alternative suppliers, especially Russia, gain unexpected strategic weight. With export routes less exposed to Hormuz and lifting of its sanction bt the United States, Russia can offer what becomes scarce in times of crisis: relative reliability. The paradox is clear. A conflict intended to weaken one actor ends up strengthening others, not through alliance, but through the unintended redistribution of economic opportunity. War, in this sense, does not merely destroy. It also reallocates.

與此同時，中國處于一種更為模糊的地位。作為深度嵌入全球貿易體系、且依賴中東能源流動的大國，中國在結構上直接暴露于這場危機之中。然而，它仍然避免將這種暴露轉化為直接的安全介入。其應對依舊審慎，強調穩定與對話，同時依賴間接性的影響渠道。

Meanwhile, China occupies a more ambiguous position. Deeply embedded in global trade and dependent on Middle Eastern energy flows, it is structurally exposed to the crisis. Yet it continues to avoid translating that exposure into direct security engagement. Its response remains cautious, emphasizing stability and dialogue while relying on indirect channels of influence.

這種策略或許能夠帶來短期靈活性，但也引出了一個更長遠的問題：一個在全球經濟網絡中占據如此核心位置的大國，如果在地緣政治風險急劇上升的時刻選擇缺席，它還能否保持戰略可信度？隨著時間推移，這種選擇性介入，可能會削弱那些面臨安全威脅、卻得不到相應保障的伙伴對其的信心。

This strategy may offer short-term flexibility, but it raises a longer-term question: can a power so central to global economic networks remain strategically credible if it is absent at moments of acute geopolitical risk? Over time, selective engagement may erode confidence among partners facing security threats without corresponding guarantees.

德黑蘭一處廣告牌上繪有霍爾木茲海峽圖案，并懸掛著一條寫有 “永遠掌控在伊朗手中” 的橫幅。圖源：《紐約時報》

以色列：戰術優勢與戰略模糊性

Israel: Tactical Superiority, Strategic Ambiguity

以色列在塑造這場沖突的軍事節奏方面發揮了決定性作用，然而，其所處位置始終帶有一種持續存在的張力：一方面是戰術上的成功，另一方面則是戰略上的不確定性。

Israel has played a decisive role in shaping the military tempo of the conflict, yet its position is marked by a persistent tension between tactical success and strategic uncertainty.

戰略目標：削弱，而非占領

Strategic Objectives: Degrade Rather Than Occupy

以色列的核心目標通常并不是領土征服，而是能力削弱。

Israel’s core objective has not often been territorial conquest, but capability degradation.

這包括：

• 削弱伊朗的導彈與無人機基礎設施；

• 延緩或削弱伊朗與核相關的能力；

• 降低地區代理人網絡的實際作戰效能。

This included:

• weakening Iran’s missile and drone infrastructure;

• delaying or degrading nuclear-related capabilities;

• reducing the operational effectiveness of regional proxy networks.

這種做法反映了以色列長期以來的一項戰略原則：防止對手在戰略能力上接近均勢，尤其是在導彈能力和核潛力方面。

This approach reflects a long-standing Israeli doctrine: preventing adversaries from approaching strategic parity, particularly in missile capability and nuclear potential.

空襲行動已造成嚴重破壞。然而，伊朗似乎仍保有相當程度的殘余能力，尤其是在導彈力量方面。這凸顯出一個結構性限制：空中力量可以削弱深嵌式基礎設施，但很難將其徹底清除。

Air campaigns have inflicted serious damage. Yet Iran appears to retain substantial residual capability, especially in missile forces. This underlines a structural limitation: air power can degrade embedded infrastructure, but it rarely eliminates it entirely.

升級邏輯與戰略風險

Escalation Logic andStrategic Risk

以色列的戰略同樣包含升級管理這一層面。它試圖通過提高沖突烈度，改變既有戰略方程，迫使對手作出代價高昂的回應，或陷入誤判。

Israel’s strategy also continue to include an element of escalation management. By raising the intensity of the conflict, it seeks to alter the strategic equation and force adversaries into costly responses or miscalculation.

然而，升級本身也伴隨著風險：

• 在持續作戰中對美國形成更深程度的依賴；

• 引發地區外溢；

• 一旦行動進一步擴大，國際政治成本也將不斷上升。

Yet escalation carries risks:

• deeper dependence on the United States for sustained operations;

• regional spillover;

• growing international political costs if operations broaden.

其中的悖論十分明顯：以色列在戰術層面優勢清晰，但其長期戰略結果仍然充滿不確定性。

The paradox is evident. Tactical superiority is clear, but long-term strategic outcomes remain uncertain.

攔截困境

The Interception Dilemma

以色列的一項關鍵脆弱性，體現在攔截的經濟性上。伊朗使用相對低成本的無人機和導彈，迫使以色列動用價格高昂的攔截系統。久而久之，這就形成了一種不利的交換比率：進攻方付出較少，防御方卻要承擔高得多的成本。

One of Israel’s key vulnerabilities lies in the economics of interception. Iran’s use of relatively low-cost drones and missiles obliges Israel to deploy expensive interception systems. Over time, this creates an unfavorable exchange ratio: the attacker spends less; the defender spends far more.

如果這種模式持續下去，即便是技術先進的軍隊，也會承受顯著壓力。簡言之，以色列在戰術上是有效的，但這并不意味著它必然能夠取得戰略主導地位。

If sustained, such a pattern can impose significant strain even on a technologically advanced military. Israel, in short, is tactically effective, but not guaranteed strategic dominance.

在2025年6月的十二日戰爭期間，遭受伊朗導彈襲擊后，以色列巴特亞姆的建筑遭到嚴重破壞。圖源：Wikimedia Commons

歐洲：從戰略震蕩到戰略重估

Europe: From Strategic Shock to Strategic Reassessment

在這場戰爭中，歐洲及其他次級行為體所扮演的角色受到更大限制。這些行為體并不塑造沖突的發展軌跡；它們所承受的是沖突帶來的后果。能源價格波動、供應中斷和通貨膨脹，將外部沖擊轉化為國內的政治與經濟壓力。即便是加強戰略自主的努力，也在很大程度上仍然是被動反應，其驅動力不是去主導不穩定，而是去應對不穩定。

In this war, the role of Europe and other secondary actors is even more constrained. These actors do not shape the trajectory of the conflict; they absorb its consequences. Energy price volatility, supply disruptions, and inflation convert external shocks into domestic political and economic stress. Even efforts to strengthen strategic autonomy remain largely reactive, driven by the need to manage instability rather than direct it.

這場沖突進一步激化了一場已醞釀多年的爭論：歐洲對外部安全保障的依賴，以及其自主行動能力的有限性。

The conflict has sharpened a debate that has been building for years: Europe’s dependence on external security guarantees and its limited capacity for autonomous action.

歐洲安全框架仍然錨定于北約，并由此延伸至美國。然而，這場沖突的早期階段暴露出歐洲各國政府對升級決策的影響力十分有限，從而進一步強化了外界對于其依賴性以及能動性減弱的擔憂。

The European security framework remains anchored in NATO and, by extension, the United States. Yet the early stages of the conflict exposed the limited influence of European governments over escalation decisions, reinforcing concerns about both dependence and diminished agency.

因此，“戰略自主”這一理念已不再只是停留在理論層面，而是開始切實進入具體政策討論，議題包括：

As a result, the idea of strategic autonomy is no longer merely theoretical. It now informs concrete policy debates over:

• 重建歐洲的國防工業基礎；

• 儲備彈藥和關鍵零部件；

• 降低對非歐洲供應商提供關鍵軍事技術的依賴；

• 提升聯合采購與快速反應能力。

• rebuilding Europe’s defense-industrial base;

• stockpiling munitions and critical components;

• reducing dependence on non-European suppliers for key military technologies;

• improving joint procurement and rapid-response capabilities.

這一討論并非抽象空泛。它直接關系到俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭所帶來的教訓；這場戰爭暴露出歐洲在軍事準備方面存在嚴重的彈藥短缺和深層次的工業能力不足。

This discussion is not abstract. It is directly linked to the lessons of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which exposed severe ammunition shortages and deep industrial deficiencies in European military preparedness.

在這場不斷演進的討論中，法國占據著尤為突出的地位。作為歐盟中唯一擁有獨立核威懾力量的成員國，法國日益被視為不是集體防務的替代者，而是一個更具自主性的歐洲安全框架的潛在支柱。

Within this evolving debate, France occupies a particularly prominent position. As the only EU member with an independent nuclear deterrent, France is increasingly viewed not as a substitute for collective defense, but as a potential pillar of a more autonomous European security framework.

歐洲軍力規模可觀：歐洲北約成員合計擁有約190萬現役軍人，并配備包括F-35戰機和豹2主戰坦克在內的先進裝備。自2023年以來，歐洲整體防務支出也顯著上升，波蘭等國甚至提出將軍費提升至GDP的5%。圖源：路透社

全球南方：影響不止于能源

The Global South: Beyond Energy

這場戰爭對全球南方的沖擊，遠遠超出了能源價格層面。沖突加劇了全球糧食體系原有的脆弱性。非洲、中東和南亞的許多國家，仍然高度依賴進口化肥，尤其是氮肥產品。航運線路受擾、能源價格上漲以及與制裁相關的摩擦，都推高了化肥成本。

The impact of the war on the Global South extends far beyond energy prices.The conflict has aggravated existing vulnerabilities in global food systems. Many countries across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia remain highly dependent on imported fertilizers, particularly nitrogen-based products. Disruptions to shipping routes, rising energy prices, and sanctions-related frictions have all increased fertilizer costs.

由于化肥生產本身高度依賴能源，特別是以天然氣為原料的氮肥，其生產成本會直接受到能源價格上升的傳導影響，并進一步推高糧食生產成本。其結果是：

Because fertilizer production is highly energy-intensive, especially in the case of nitrogen fertilizers derived from natural gas, higher energy prices feed directly into food production costs. The result is:

• 糧食價格上漲；

• 糧食進口國面臨更大壓力；

• 脆弱地區的糧食不安全狀況進一步惡化。

• rising food prices;

• greater pressure on food-importing states;

• worsening food insecurity in vulnerable regions.

因此，許多發展中經濟體不得不同時承受能源、糧食和物流成本的多重沖擊，使其成為這場沖突中在結構上暴露程度最高、受損最深的一類輸家。

Many developing economies are therefore forced to absorb simultaneous shocks in energy, food, and logistics costs, making them among the most structurally exposed losers of the conflict.

戰爭戰略、能力約束，以及正在浮現的贏家與輸家

War Strategies, Capacity Constraints, and Emerging Winners and Losers

這場沖突并不只是海灣地區的一場區域性軍事對抗。它同時也是一場具有啟示意義的檢驗，檢驗大國如何發動戰爭、如何管理資源，以及如何為更長期的競爭進行布局。這里關注的是實踐層面的問題：誰在做什么，使用了哪些工具，以及由此誰受益、誰受損。

This conflict is not merely a regional military confrontation in the Gulf. It is also a revealing test of how major powers wage war, manage resources, and position themselves for longer-term competition. The focus here is practical: who is doing what, with which tools, and who benefits or loses as a result.

美國：受制約的高強度戰爭

The United States: High-Intensity Warfare Under Constraint

美國仍然憑借航母打擊群、遠程空中力量以及精確制導彈藥，持續投射無與倫比的軍事力量。這種作戰主導地位，從沖突一開始便已清晰可見。

The United States continues to project unparalleled military power through naval strike groups, long-range air assets, and precision-guided munitions. This operational dominance has been visible from the earliest stages of the conflict.

然而，這種戰爭模式也暴露出一種日益加劇的張力。美國雖然能夠迅速投送壓倒性的力量，但要在一段時間內持續維持這種強度則更加困難。精確制導彈藥、攔截導彈以及先進空射系統的快速消耗，暴露出其在庫存深度和生產能力方面的脆弱性。

Yet this model of warfare also reveals a growing tension. While the United States can deliver overwhelming force quickly, sustaining that level of intensity over time is more difficult. The rapid consumption of precision-guided munitions, interceptor missiles, and advanced air-launched systems exposes vulnerabilities in stockpile depth and production capacity.

這一挑戰并不僅僅是財政問題，更是工業問題。國防供應鏈依賴專用零部件、熟練勞動力以及復雜制造流程，而這些都無法在短時間內迅速擴張。因此，關鍵系統的補充周期可能需要以“年”而非“月”來計算。

The challenge is not purely financial. It is industrial. Defense supply chains depend on specialized components, skilled labor, and complex manufacturing processes that cannot be expanded rapidly. Replenishing key systems may therefore take years rather than months.

另一個值得關注的維度，是軍事行動與美國國防工業基礎之間的關系。這場沖突中所動用的諸多武器系統，主要來自既有庫存，以及原本部署于歐洲或其他戰區的資源。它們的投入使用，會進一步加快替換與現代化升級的需求。這種補充循環支撐著國防生產，帶動工業活動，并維持就業。

A further dimension concerns the relationship between military operations and the U.S. defense-industrial base. Systems deployed in this conflict are drawn from existing stockpiles and mainly from Europe, or in other theaters. Their use accelerates the demand for replacement and modernization. This replenishment cycle sustains defense production, generates industrial activity, and supports employment.

從這個意義上說，現代戰爭不僅關乎“能否作戰”，也關乎“能否在時間推移中持續維持并再生戰力”。

In this sense, modern warfare is not only about the ability to fight. It is also about the ability to sustain and regenerate force over time.

與此同時，美國也存在能力短板。其中一個例子是反水雷能力。在霍爾木茲海峽這類狹窄海上咽喉要道中，這種能力至關重要。而相關資產的相對稀缺，恰恰凸顯出高端力量投送能力與實際作戰適應能力之間存在失衡。

There are also capability gaps. One example concerns mine countermeasure capacity, which is crucial in narrow maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. The relative scarcity of such assets highlights an imbalance between high-end force projection and operational adaptability.

綜合來看，這些動態表明，盡管美國依然保持著無可匹敵的軍事投射范圍，但其在長期沖突情境下的可持續性正越來越受到審視，尤其是在未來可能與中國或其他競爭對手發生對抗的背景下，更是如此。

Taken together, these dynamics suggest that while the United States retains unmatched military reach, its sustainability in prolonged conflict scenarios is increasingly under scrutiny, especially in light of a possible future confrontation with China or other competitors.

俄羅斯：通過擾動實現戰略機會主義

Russia: Strategic Opportunism Through Disruption

對俄羅斯而言，這場沖突與其說是一個直接軍事介入的戰場，不如說是一個獲取間接戰略收益的機會。由于已深度卷入烏克蘭戰事，莫斯科總體上采取了一種借勢獲利的姿態。

For Russia, the conflict is less a direct military arena than an opportunity for indirect strategic gain. Already deeply engaged in Ukraine, Moscow has largely adopted a posture of opportunistic benefit.

能源價格上漲、市場波動加劇以及全球能源流向的重新調整，都對俄羅斯有利。更高的油氣收入有助于對沖烏克蘭戰爭帶來的成本壓力，而西方注意力的轉移，也減輕了俄羅斯周邊直接戰略環境所承受的外部壓力。

Rising energy prices, market volatility, and the redirection of global energy flows work to Russia’s advantage. Higher hydrocarbon revenues help offset costs impounded by the war in Ukrain, and while Western distraction reduces pressure on Russia’s immediate strategic environment.

從這個意義上說，俄羅斯的姿態可以概括為：借由體系性分散注意力而實現被動獲益。

In this sense, Russia’s posture may be described as one of passive gain through systemic distraction.

中國：謹慎布局與經濟收益

China: Cautious Positioning and Economic Advantage

中國的處境則有所不同。北京避免直接軍事介入，同時將自身定位為一個審慎的穩定維護者和經濟受益者。

China’s position is different. Beijing has avoided direct military involvement while positioning itself as both a cautious stabilizer and an economic beneficiary.

其核心利益主要在于能源安全與貿易連續性。海灣局勢的不穩定，提升了替代性供應安排、折價能源獲取以及物流網絡多元化的價值。與此同時，這場沖突也為中國提供了一個觀察美國軍事承壓、供應鏈脆弱性以及聯盟行為模式的機會，而這些經驗對于未來印太地區的情境具有高度相關性。

Its primary interests lie in energy security and trade continuity. Gulf instability increases the value of alternative supply arrangements, discounted energy access, and diversified logistics networks. At the same time, the conflict provides China with an opportunity to observe U.S. military strain, supply chain weaknesses, and alliance behavior, lessons that are highly relevant to future Indo-Pacific scenarios.

中國的優勢，相比于高調介入，更集中于戰略耐心與有選擇性的經濟獲益。

China’s advantage lies less in dramatic intervention than instrategic patience and selective economic gain.

聯盟裂痕與歐洲缺位

Coalition Fractures and the European Gap

這場沖突最引人注目的特征之一，是西方陣營缺乏凝聚性的協調，尤其是在歐洲內部表現得更為明顯。若干歐洲國家并未真正參與早期戰略決策，因此對相關政策的政治認同有限，在某些情況下甚至僅提供審慎或不情愿的支持。這與以往一些跨大西洋協調看起來更為穩固的危機形成鮮明對比。

One of the most striking features of this conflict has been the absence of cohesive Western alignment, particularly within Europe.

Several European states were not meaningfully involved in early strategic decisions, producing limited political ownership and, in some cases, cautious or reluctant support. This stands in contrast to earlier crises in which transatlantic coordination appeared more robust.

隨著局勢演進，尤其是歐盟，愈發像一個旁觀者，而非具有決定性影響的行為體。這進一步強化了歐洲內部原已存在的一場辯論：是否需要更大程度的戰略自主。

As this scenario unfolds, the European Union, in particular, look more like an observer than a decisive actor. This has reinforced an existing internal debate over the need for greater strategic autonomy.

在這一背景下，法國的重要性再次上升。其核威懾力量正越來越多地被討論為未來歐洲安全架構中的一個潛在支柱。盡管更廣泛的“歐洲核保護傘”設想在政治上仍然敏感，但它已不再只是停留在理論討論之中。

Within this setting, France has acquired renewed importance. Its nuclear deterrent is increasingly discussed as a potential pillar of a future European security architecture. While the notion of a broader European nuclear umbrella remains politically sensitive, it is no longer confined to theoretical debate.

沖突經濟中的贏家

Winners of the Conflict Economy

除直接卷入敵對行動的國家之外，這場沖突還催生出一批相對明確的經濟受益者。

Beyond the states directly engaged in hostilities, the conflict has generated a distinct set of economic beneficiaries.

其中包括：

• 能源生產國，它們受益于價格上漲和市場趨緊；

• 俄羅斯，其收益來自油氣收入增加以及能源流向重組；

• 中國，其可能獲得更有利的能源安排和更大的貿易杠桿；

• 保險與航運企業，它們從更高保費和風險定價中獲利；

• 國防工業，尤其是美國和歐洲的軍工產業，它們受益于對武器、彈藥、攔截系統以及補充更新周期的持續需求。

These include:

• energy producers, who benefit from elevated prices and tighter markets;

• Russia, which gains from hydrocarbon revenues and shifting energy flows;

• China, which may secure favorable energy arrangements and greater trade leverage;

• insurance and shipping firms, which profit from higher premiums and risk-related pricing;

• defense industries, particularly in the United States and Europe, which benefit from sustained demand for weapons, ammunition, interception systems, and replacement cycles.
  

輸家與結構性成本

Losers and Structural Costs

在主要輸家之中，其所承受的成本同樣不容忽視：

Among the principal losers, the costs are equally significant:

• 美國，面臨不斷加劇的資源壓力、持續上升的作戰成本以及過度擴張的風險；

• 歐盟，在政治上被邊緣化，在經濟上高度暴露，且內部意見分裂；

• 地區穩定本身，因海灣國家正面對更強烈的不安全感與不確定性；

• 全球南方，在那里，能源、化肥、運輸和糧食成本的上升，不成比例地沖擊著本已脆弱、依賴進口的經濟體。

• the United States, which faces mounting resource strain, rising operational costs, and the risk of overextension;

• the European Union, which is politically marginalized, economically exposed, and internally divided;

• regional stability itself, as Gulf states confront heightened insecurity and uncertainty;

• the Global South, where higher energy, fertilizer, transport, and food costs disproportionately affect already vulnerable, import-dependent economies.

• These losses are not evenly distributed. They fall most heavily on those least able to shape the strategic environment.

全球絕大多數最不發達國家都是能源凈進口國。

初步教訓與正在顯現的方向

Early Lessons and Emerging Directions

從這場沖突中，已經可以總結出若干初步教訓。

Several early lessons can already be drawn from this conflict.

第一，在現代戰爭中，可持續性與能力本身同樣重要。

第二，工業能力如今已是一種戰略資產，而不再只是背景條件。

第三，聯盟不僅需要軍事上的協調一致，也需要政治上的包容與參與。

第四，在塑造沖突結果方面，經濟行為體的重要性并不亞于軍事行為體。

第五，非對稱戰爭有可能通過更為復雜、更具總體性的戰略取得勝勢。

First, sustainability matters as much as capability in modern warfare.

Second, industrial capacity is now a strategic asset, not a background condition.

Third,alliances require political inclusion, not merely military alignment.

Fourth, economic actors are as influential as military actors in shaping conflict outcomes.

Fifth, Asymetric warfare could be won with a more sophisticated and all encompassing strategies.

對歐洲來說，這些教訓正日益沉淀為一套新的戰略表述：自力更生、戰略自主和防務一體化。盡管這些表述能否最終落實為具體政策仍存不確定性，但相關討論的總體走向已十分清晰。

For Europe, these lessons are increasingly being translated into a new strategic vocabulary: self-reliance, strategic autonomy, and defense integration. Whether this vocabulary becomes policy remains uncertain, but the direction of debate is unmistakable.

結論：一場沒有勝者的沖突，一個失去錨點的體系

Conclusion: A Conflict Without Victory, a System Without Anchor

這里所考察的這場沖突，并未走向決定性的軍事勝利，也沒有帶來清晰的權力再分配。相反，它揭示出國際政治中一種更深層的結構性現實：單一權力組織中心正在被侵蝕，而穩定的替代性安排卻并未出現。

The conflict examined here does not culminate in a decisive military victory or a clear redistribution of power. Instead, it reveals a deeper structural reality in international politics: the erosion of a single organizing center of power without the emergence of a stable alternative.

那種認為壓倒性的軍事能力能夠帶來決定性結果的傳統假設，已變得越來越難以維持。盡管美國擁有技術優勢，但它在工業產能、庫存補充以及政治承載力方面正面臨日益增大的約束。這些限制并不以任何簡單意義上的方式構成衰落，但它們的確削弱了這樣一種假設：在持久、跨戰區沖突的時代，單靠軍事力量就能夠確保政治結果。

The traditional assumption that overwhelming military capability can produce decisive outcomes has become increasingly difficult to sustain. Despite its technological superiority, the United States faces growing constraints in industrial capacity, stockpile regeneration, and political bandwidth. These limitations do not amount to decline in any simple sense, but they do weaken the assumption that military power alone cannot secure political outcomes in an era of prolonged, multi-theater conflict.

對以色列而言，這場戰爭表明，戰術上的成功在實現戰略性解決方面是有其限度的。其作戰能力依然強大，但更廣泛的目標——永久性削弱伊朗的能力——仍然難以實現。伊朗導彈力量和非對稱作戰資產的持續存在，指向了現代沖突中的一種反復出現的模式：技術上占優的行為體能夠施加代價，但往往難以施加終局。

For Israel, the war demonstrates the limits of tactical success in achieving strategic resolution. Its operational capabilities remain formidable, yet the broader objective of permanently degrading Iran’s capabilities remains elusive. The persistence of Iran’s missile and asymmetric assets points to a recurring pattern in modern conflict: technologically superior actors can impose costs, but they often struggle to impose finality.

伊朗則使局勢進一步復雜化。盡管遭受了重大打擊，它仍保有通過擾亂能源市場和制造地區不穩定、在其疆域之外施加代價的能力。這并不等同于勝利，但確實構成了一種戰略杠桿。伊朗既非明確的贏家，也不是被擊敗的力量，而是一個持續性的擾動者，能夠在其常規軍事實力之外影響局勢走向。

Iran further complicates the picture. Despite significant damage, it has retained the ability to impose costs well beyond its borders through disruption of energy markets and regional instability. This does not amount to victory, but it does constitute a form of strategic leverage. Iran emerges neither as a clear winner nor as a defeated power, but as a persistent disruptor capable of influencing outcomes beyond its conventional military weight.

與此同時，歐洲呈現出來的并不是一個核心行為體，而是一個受到限制的行為體。這場沖突強化了人們長期以來對戰略依賴和決策碎片化的擔憂。圍繞戰略自主的新一輪討論，以及法國作為潛在安全支點所受到的日益關注，反映出各方對依賴外部安全保障日益增長的不安。然而，制度、政治和戰略層面的分歧，仍在繼續限制歐洲采取協調一致行動的能力。

Europe, meanwhile, emerges not as a central actor, but as a constrained one. The conflict reinforces longstanding concerns about strategic dependence and fragmented decision-making. The renewed debate over strategic autonomy, and the growing attention given to France as a possible security anchor, reflect rising unease over reliance on external guarantees. Yet institutional, political, and strategic divisions continue to limit Europe’s capacity to act cohesively.

除直接參戰方之外，這場沖突還產生了顯著的次生效應。能源生產國、國防工業以及與風險相關的金融部門從這種擾動中獲益，而全球南方則因能源價格上漲、糧食成本上升以及經濟脆弱性加劇而承擔了不成比例的代價。這種不對稱性揭示了國際體系中權力與風險分布的不均衡。

Beyond the immediate participants, the conflict has generated significant secondary effects. Energy producers, defense industries, and risk-related financial sectors have benefited from disruption, while the Global South has borne disproportionate costs through higher energy prices, rising food costs, and increased economic vulnerability. This asymmetry reveals the uneven distribution of both power and risk in the international system.

綜合來看，這些動態指向了一場更廣泛的轉型。這場沖突并未開啟一種新的穩定秩序，而是加速了一個本已展開的過渡進程：國際體系正從單極格局走向一個更加碎片化、競爭性更強的局面。然而，碎片化并不會自動帶來均衡。更常見的情況是，它會催生彼此交疊的競爭地帶、不斷變動的結盟關系，以及不穩定的威懾格局。

Taken together, these dynamics point to a broader transformation. The conflict does not inaugurate a new stable order. Rather, it accelerates a transition already underway: a movement away from a unipolar system toward a more fragmented and contested landscape. Yet fragmentation does not automatically produce balance. More often, it generates overlapping zones of competition, shifting alignments, and unstable deterrence.

在缺乏一個能夠強制維持秩序的主導性霸權力量的情況下，未來可能出現幾種不同的演變路徑。

In the absence of a dominant hegemonic power capable of enforcing order, several trajectories become possible.

其一，是進一步的碎片化，其特征是相互競爭的勢力范圍、經濟脫鉤以及多邊機構作用的削弱。在這樣的世界中，權力將變得更加地方化，而合作也會愈發呈現交易性特征。

One is deeper fragmentation, marked by competing spheres of influence, economic decoupling, and weakened multilateral institutions. In such a world, power becomes more localized and cooperation increasingly transactional.

其二，是區域秩序的鞏固，即各地區強國在自身勢力范圍內承擔更多安全與治理責任。這可能提升區域自主性，但也可能加劇區域之間的競爭。

A second is the consolidation of regional orders, in which regional powers assume greater responsibility for security and governance within their own spheres. This may increase regional autonomy, but it may also intensify interregional rivalry.

其三，則是中等強國之間聯盟的漸進形成。那些既非超級大國、也非邊緣小國的國家，可能會越來越多地圍繞安全、經濟韌性和技術治理展開協調，通過構建靈活的對齊關系來共同管理風險。這類聯盟不會取代現有制度，但可能在一定程度上彌補其侵蝕所造成的缺口。

A third lies in the gradual emergence of coalitions among middle powers. States that are neither superpowers nor minor actors may increasingly coordinate on security, economic resilience, and technological governance, forming flexible alignments to manage shared risks. These coalitions would not replace existing institutions, but they might partially compensate for their erosion.

就目前而言，這幾種路徑都尚未占據主導地位。因此，國際體系仍處于流動狀態，其運行特征表現為局部性的對齊、間歇性的合作，以及反復出現的不穩定。因此，這里所討論的這場沖突，并不只是一次地區危機。它更是世界秩序更廣泛轉型的一種體現：在這一轉型中，權力更加分散，權威更具爭議，結果也更難預測。這個新興時代最鮮明的特征，不是任何單一行為體的支配地位，而恰恰是不確定性本身的持續存在。

At present, none of these trajectories is dominant. The international system therefore remains fluid, shaped by partial alignments, episodic cooperation, and recurrent instability.

The conflict examined here is thus not simply a regional crisis. It is a manifestation of a wider transition in world order: one in which power is more dispersed, authority more contested, and outcomes less predictable. The defining feature of this emerging era is not the dominance of any single actor, but the persistence of uncertainty itself.

梅赫里·馬達爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽教授、聯合國教科文組織下屬國際創意和可持續發展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會成員

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) , South China University of Technology (SCUT) ; Member of the Advisory Committee of the International Center for Creativity and Sustainable Development under the auspicious of UNESO (ICCSD).

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