萬字長文精譯！Stan Druckenmiller最新訪談：買入銅與金！成功關(guān)鍵不在智商，而在于扣動扳機的能力..

我認為“逆向投資”被過度神化了，不過我確實喜歡那種我擁有極強信心但無人相信的時刻，因為它會讓我的信念更加堅定。”

本期我們跟進摩根士丹利與傳奇投資大師斯坦·德魯肯米勒的今日最新訪談，

節(jié)目上斯坦坦誠道曾因投資焦慮到每周嘔吐一到兩次，就在這無數(shù)次的嘔吐中建立起來的出色業(yè)績，讓斯坦的成功不再是偶然...那些被焦慮淬煉過的洞見，在當下仍然句句見血。我們有必要再次屏住呼吸，去觸摸斯坦娓娓道來的40年厚重智慧...

Narrator:From Morgan Stanley, this is Hard Lessons… where iconic investors reveal the critical moments that have shaped who they are today.

Narrator：歡迎收聽摩根士丹利的「Hard Lessons」。在這里，具有代表性的投資家們將講述那些塑造今日之他們的關(guān)鍵時刻。

Today on the show—the legendary macro investor Stan Druckenmiller in conversation with Iliana Bouzali, Morgan Stanley's Global Head of Derivatives, Distribution and Structuring.

今天節(jié)目邀請到的嘉賓是傳奇宏觀投資人斯坦·德魯肯米勒（Stan Druckenmiller），他將與摩根士丹利全球衍生品、分銷與結(jié)構(gòu)化主管Iliana Bouzali進行對話。

Druckenmiller ran Duquesne Capital Management with roughly 30% annualized returns and no losing years from 1981 to 2010.

德魯肯米勒曾在1981年至2010年間執(zhí)掌杜肯資本管理公司，實現(xiàn)了約30%的年化回報率且無一年虧損。

He now leads the Duquesne Family Office, managing his own capital, and is a philanthropist championing education, medical research, and the fight against poverty.

他現(xiàn)在領(lǐng)導杜肯家族辦公室管理自有資金，同時也致力于教育、醫(yī)學研究和脫貧事業(yè)的慈善事業(yè)。

Iliana Bouzali:Stan, thank you very much for doing this.

Iliana Bouzali：斯坦，非常感謝你能來參加這次節(jié)目。

Stan Druckenmiller:I'm thrilled to be here. I think the world of Morgan Stanley, so it's the least I can do.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：很高興來到這里，我非常看好摩根士丹利，所以這是我力所能及的事情。

Bouzali:That is, it’s a privilege for us to have you here. I've been privy to some of your equity trades over the past year or so, where it did feel you were early, and I'm curious if you can, maybe, take us through one or two and how they came together.

布扎利：能邀請到您是我們的榮幸。在過去一年左右的時間里，我有幸觀察到了您的一些股票交易，感覺有時你的入場時間點比較早。我很好奇，您是否能帶我們回顧其中的一兩個案例，談談這些交易是如何達成的。

Stan Druckenmiller:I'll pick one that might surprise you because it's not very sexy and it's not AI or anything, but I think it's a good example of our process at Duquesne.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：我選一個可能會讓你感到驚訝的案例，因為它并不那么讓人眼前一亮，也不是人工智能之類的，但我認為它是一個對杜肯投資過程的很好例證。

In the middle of last summer and toward the fall, the AI thing started to get, let me say, disturbingly heated and started at least to have some rhyme with what I went through in ‘99, 2000 and we were looking for other areas.

在去年盛夏到入秋期間，AI的熱度開始變得——怎么說呢——令人不安地狂熱，至少讓我產(chǎn)生了一些1999年和2000年時的既視感，于是我們開始尋找其他領(lǐng)域。

The group brought in a company, Teva Pharmaceuticals. So Teva was this apparently, if you didn't know what was going on, a boring generic drug company out of Israel, selling at six times earnings.

團隊推薦了一家公司，叫梯瓦制藥（Teva Pharmaceuticals）。如果你不了解它的話，會覺得梯瓦看起來就是一家來自以色列、市盈率僅6倍的末流仿制藥公司。

So, we met with the company—big transition going on. Richard Francis had come in who ran the same playbook at Sandoz. Very impressed with him—new how to take low-hanging fruit in terms of operating efficiency.

我們與公司管理層見了面，發(fā)現(xiàn)當時他們正處于巨大的轉(zhuǎn)型期。理查德·弗朗西斯（Richard Francis）已經(jīng)上任，他曾在山德士（Sandoz）執(zhí)行過同樣的策略。他的表現(xiàn)給我們留下了深刻的印象，他懂得如何通過提高運營效率來摘取“低垂的果實”。

But, much more importantly, he was taking them from a generic drug company to a growth company by embracing biosimilars, replacing the generic drugs, which that's why they were six times earnings with biosimilars and even some, some actual drugs.

但更重要的一點是，他正在試圖通過擁抱“生物類似藥”，甚至一些原研藥，將公司從仿制藥公司轉(zhuǎn)型為成長型公司，而正是這些普通仿制藥，讓公司的市盈率僅有6倍。

The amazing thing is, the investor base were value investors, so they hated it. So, the stock sat there at six times earnings, while you could see this incredible management initiative going on. And, no one really believed him.

令人驚訝的是，當時的投資者群體全是價值投資者，而這些投資者討厭弗朗西斯提出的這一倡議。因此，在這種出色的管理層倡議正在推進時，股價卻因為沒人相信這一倡議而停滯在6倍市盈率。

And again, growth investors didn't want it because they hadn’t made the transition yet. Value investors didn't want it and were actually selling it because he was doing a growth strategy.

而且，成長型投資者不想要它，因為轉(zhuǎn)型尚未完成；價值投資者也不想要它，甚至因為弗朗西斯執(zhí)行這一成長戰(zhàn)略而拋售它。

So that was about six or seven months ago and the stock was $16. And today it's $32 and not much has happened. Other than he's proved biosimilars, they've come up with a drug that's not a generic.

那是大約六七個月前的事，當時股價是16美元，今天它是32美元，其實期間并沒發(fā)生什么大事，除了他證明了生物類似藥的潛力，而且他們還研發(fā)出了一種非仿制藥。

So it's re-rated from six times earnings to, I guess, 11.5 or 12 times earnings. So, it was a whole different set of circumstances but it encapsulates what we look at. If you look at today, you're not going to make any money.

所以它的估值從6倍市盈率上漲到了大概11.5或12倍。雖然這一情況完全不同，但它概括了我們的關(guān)注點：如果你只看當下，是賺不到錢的。

If you try and look ahead and what might change and how investors might perceive something ahead. This one happened a little more quicker than I thought, but that would be a recent name.

你必須向前看，思考什么可能會發(fā)生變化，以及投資者未來會如何認知這些變化。這個案例的兌現(xiàn)比我想象得快一點，但這是最近的一個典型。

Bouzali:Fascinating. And very intriguing. I say it's intriguing because I think many people, maybe people not in the market, but certainly many people, when they think of Stan Druckenmiller, they think of a huge macro investor.

布扎利：這個案例非常引人入勝，非常有意思。我之所以說它有意思，是因為我覺得很多人——也許是非市場專業(yè)人士，但肯定包括很多人——在想到斯坦·德魯肯米勒時，會認為您是一個宏觀巨頭。

And I have seen you dabble—more than dabble—really go into areas of the market, especially in equities, that are much more niche, such as healthcare or biotech.

但我看到您涉足——甚至不止是涉足——深度進入了市場中那些非常細分的領(lǐng)域，尤其在股票上，比如醫(yī)療保健或生物技術(shù)。

And my question is, do you have to be an expert, an analyst, someone that understands the whole pipeline of drugs to get that right?

我的問題是：您是否必須成為專家，或者成為那種理解整個藥物研發(fā)管線的專家才能做對這些交易？

Stan Druckenmiller:Thank God the answer is an emphatic no. But I've got to have an expert at Duquesne who is, and trust his judgment, and then I've got to have a feel for how the market will embrace the change he's describing.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：謝天謝地，答案一定是否定的，但杜肯必須擁有一位這樣的專家，并且我們要信任他的判斷，然后我必須去試圖分析市場將如何接納他所描述的這種變化。

But we did make a big move into biotech. I could sense that there was a potential leadership change just because of the phobia around AI.

我們確實在生物技術(shù)領(lǐng)域有大動作，我當時能感覺到那種由于對AI的恐懼，市場領(lǐng)導位置發(fā)生的更替。

And, I knew because I've been on the board of Memorial Sloan-Kettering for 30 years, that probably the best use case out there of AI is biotech through drug discovery, diagnostics, monitoring everything. So, biotech had been on its butt for like four years.

而且我在紀念斯隆-凱特琳癌癥中心董事會待了30年，我深知AI在生物領(lǐng)域落地最好的用例可能就是生物技術(shù)，比如測試藥物發(fā)現(xiàn)、診斷、監(jiān)測等所有環(huán)節(jié)，此前生物技術(shù)已經(jīng)低迷了大約四年。

I also grew up with technical analysis and you could see the momentum changing. So, that was the theory behind biotech. But honestly, when the analysts start talking about genetic sequencing and gene editing and proteins, it's going right over Stan's head.

我也是在技術(shù)分析的背景下成長起來的，當時我們能看到動能正在發(fā)生變化，這就是投資生物技術(shù)的理論基礎(chǔ)。但坦率地說，分析師談論的基因測序、基因編輯和蛋白質(zhì)這些，已經(jīng)完全超出了我的理解范疇。

But I get their level of enthusiasm. We have a very good biotech team. That's really important because I trust them, and when they're really enthusiastic, that's as important to me as the actual facts, because I'm not smart enough to understand a lot of the actual facts.

但我能感受到他們的熱情程度，我們有一支非常優(yōu)秀的生物技術(shù)團隊，這非常重要，因為我信任他們，他們對此表現(xiàn)得熱忱，對我來說和實際事實一樣重要，因為我還沒有聰明到能理解很多實際的事實細節(jié)。

Bouzali:So you filter not just the data, but the people that work for you.

布扎利：所以您過濾的不只是數(shù)據(jù)，還有為您工作的人。

Stan Druckenmiller:Yeah.My advantage is not IQ, it's trigger pulling.I admit it’s some kind of intelligence. But my mother-in-law says I'm an idiot savant.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：是的。我的優(yōu)勢不在于智商，而在于扣動扳機的能力（即執(zhí)行力）。我承認這也是一種智慧，但我岳母說我是個“白癡天才”。

I wasn't in the top 10% of my class. A lot of people think I'm smarter than I am because I'm good at our business. But I have a very narrow form of intelligence that allows me to love and play this game.

我在學校時甚至不是排名前10%的學生，但很多人認為我比實際更聰明，這只是因為我很擅長我們的業(yè)務。我擁有一種非常狹隘的智慧，讓我能夠熱愛并玩轉(zhuǎn)這個游戲。

Bouzali:I know many people who would love to get inside your head and understand your mental models. You spoke to us about your way of thinking, and I have a really honest, basic question: How much of it can be taught and how much of it is innate?

布扎利：我知道很多人都想走進您的內(nèi)心，理解您的思維模型。您談到了您的思考方式，我有一個非常坦誠且基本的問題：這其中有多少是可以后天教授的，又有多少是天生的？

Stan Druckenmiller:Look, I, I was given a gift. I don't know why I was given the gift, but I have this gift and it's for compounding money. Certainly part of is innate. You either have the skill set for this business or you don't.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：聽著，我被賦予了一種天賦，那就是讓資金復利的能力，我不知道為什么會被賦予這種天賦，但我確實有。當然，其中一部分是天生的。你在這個行業(yè)要么有這種技能組合，要么沒有。

Having said that, I had a great mentor in Pittsburgh when I started out and I find it very common that great investors have incredible mentors. So to me, it's a necessary condition that you have sort of this innate skill set or gift, but it's almost a necessary condition on top of it that you have a mentor. I'm sure there's some people out there that that's not true of, but for me, it was a combination.

話雖如此，我剛出道時在匹茲堡遇到了一位偉大的導師，我發(fā)現(xiàn)偉大的投資人通常都有出色的導師，這很常見。對我而言，擁有這種先天的技能或天賦是必要條件，但在其之上，擁有一位出色的導師也幾乎是一個必要條件。我相信肯定也有人不需要導師也能成功，但對我來說，成功是天賦和導師相結(jié)合的產(chǎn)物。

I was very lucky to have two mentors. One, I basically learned all the kind of stuff we're talking about. And then Soros. It's funny, when I went there, I thought I would learn what makes the yen and the market go up and move.

我很幸運有兩位導師。第一位導師讓我學到了我們現(xiàn)在正在討論的所有這些東西；然后第二位就是索羅斯。有趣的是，我去他那里時，我以為我會學到是什么因素驅(qū)動了日元和市場走勢。

Immodestly, I learned I knew much more about that than he did. What I learned from him wassizing. It's not whether you're right or wrong, it's how much you make when you're right and how much you lose when you're wrong.

毫不謙虛地說，我后來發(fā)現(xiàn)，在這方面我懂的比他多得多。但我從他那里學到了是“倉位規(guī)模”，重點不在于你是對是錯，而在于當你對的時候你賺了多少，當你錯的時候你賠了多少。

And that was a, that was an invaluable lesson. So, you can have something innate, but if you don't have mentors and people to teach you, you're not going to maximize it as much as you do when you do have them.

那是一個無價的教訓。所以，你可以有某種天賦，但如果你沒有導師和教導你的人，那你就無法將你的天賦發(fā)揮到極致。

Bouzali:Should we turn to markets?

布扎利：我們可以聊聊市場嗎？

Stan Druckenmiller:Do we have to?

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：必須聊嗎？

Bouzali:Oh, it seems to be almost obligatory with you.

布扎利：跟您談話的話，這似乎是一個必談話題。

Stan Druckenmiller:Okay.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：好吧。

Bouzali:So, when it comes to markets, it seems to me you treat them less like forecasts and more like systems that kind of reveal themselves.

布扎利：關(guān)于市場，在我看來，您對待它們的方式不太像是在做預測，更像是在觀察系統(tǒng)的某種自我揭示。

So, let's pretend you don't have a hedge fund, and you come down from Mars and you have to start a portfolio from scratch. How do you anchor it at this moment in time? What do you buy first?

那么，讓我們假設(shè)您沒有管理對沖基金，您從火星降臨，必須從零開始構(gòu)建一個投資組合。在當前這個時間點，您會如何錨定它？您首選會買什么？

Stan Druckenmiller:That's a hard question. Just a couple principles before I would start. It appears to me the U.S. economy is already strong, and it's going to get much stronger because we're looking at the Big Beautiful Bill, looking at a lot of stimulus.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：這是一個難題，在開始之前，我想先說明幾個原則。在我看來，美國經(jīng)濟已經(jīng)很強勁了，而且由于我們正在關(guān)注的大法案（Big Beautiful Bill）以及大量的刺激措施，它還會變得更強。

My guess is the Fed is certainly not going to hike and probably going to cut. So that's a backdrop. But against that backdrop, that would be wonderful if we were undervalued. We're not undervalued. We're toward the top of the valuation range, historically.

我的猜測是美聯(lián)儲肯定不會加息，而且很可能會降息，這就是背景。但在這個背景下，如果估值比較低那就太好了，可惜情況并非如此。從歷史來看，我們正處于估值區(qū)間的頂部。

What would be exciting about developing a hedge fund portfolio right now is the one thing I'm sure of—is there's massive disruption and massive change ahead.So actually, for the opportunity to set for the next 3 or 4 years, I'm really excited.Macro has been dead for 10 or 15 years. I don't think that's the case anymore.

目前構(gòu)建對沖基金組合令人興奮的一點是——我唯一確定的是——未來會有大規(guī)模的顛覆和變革。所以實際上，對于未來3到4年的機會窗口，我非常興奮。宏觀已經(jīng)沉寂了10到15年，我認為這種情況已經(jīng)不復存在了。

But if you know anything about me, I tend to change my mind every three weeks. But given the backdrop, we would probably be long, more an eclectic basket of equities.

但如果你了解我，就知道我傾向于每三周就改變一次主意。但基于目前的背景，我們可能會做多一個更具兼容性的股票池。

For until the fall of the last three years, our portfolio is very much AI driven. We still have drips and drabs of AI around, but it's not driving the engine anymore to some extent.We still have big positions in Japan and Korea. Some of them are AI. Some of them are not.

直到去年秋天的三年里，我們的組合很大程度上是由AI驅(qū)動的。我們現(xiàn)在仍零星持有AI相關(guān)倉位，但在某種程度上它已不再是驅(qū)動引擎了。我們在日本和韓國仍有重倉，其中有些與AI相關(guān)，有些不相關(guān)。

We're bearish on the US dollar,mainly because sort of the top of the historic range in terms of purchasing power and foreigners are way, way overloaded in dollars. And I don't know whether it's like a sell America trade because it's more like if they don't buy American assets on a net basis because of the trade balance and because of the position, the dollar will go down on its own. And we think that is the most likely course here.

我們看空美元，主要是因為，從購買力來看，美元正處于歷史區(qū)間的頂部，而且外國人持有的美元頭寸已經(jīng)極度超載了。我不確定這是否屬于“拋售美國”的交易，但我們認為最可能的路徑是，如果由于貿(mào)易余額和頭寸分布，他們不在凈基礎(chǔ)上購買美國資產(chǎn)的話，美元自身就會走低。

And we own copper.It's not a genius trade. It's a big consensus trade. There's no supply coming on, meaningful supply very tight for the next eight years. And obviously you have a big add on from AI and data centers. We're not long on copper equities as much as we are, we just keep rolling the front end.

此外我們持有銅，這算不上什么天才交易，而是非常共識的交易。未來八年沒有顯著的新增供應，供應非常緊張；而且顯然，AI和數(shù)據(jù)中心帶來了巨大的增量需求。我們持有的不是銅礦股，更多是通過前端合約不斷展期。

We have some gold.That's mainly a geopolitical trade. It's not so much a monetary trade.

我們還持有黃金，這主要是一項地緣政治交易，而非貨幣政策的交易。

And then because we're long all these risk assets I just mentioned, we're short bonds.I don't necessarily expect to make money short bonds. But I think we might make a lot if I'm right on the economy and it's a disinflationary growth, I'd probably break even, and I don't lose anything, but it allows me to hold the other assets I mentioned.

最后，由于我們在做多我剛才提到的所有風險資產(chǎn)，所以我們做空債券。我不一定指望靠做空債券賺錢，但我覺得，如果我對經(jīng)濟的判斷正確——即一種反通脹式的增長，我可能會盈虧平衡，也不虧錢，但做空債券能支撐我持有上述的其他資產(chǎn)。

If I'm wrong and the strong growth creates inflation—it wouldn't be that unusual if the Fed were to cut into a booming economy for inflation to take off, particularly with what's going on with commodities.

如果我錯了，強勁增長引發(fā)了通脹——如果美聯(lián)儲在經(jīng)濟繁榮時降息導致通脹飆升，那也并不奇怪，特別是考慮到大宗商品的情況。

So I'm open minded to that.But we create a matrix and the bonds are helpful in both ways.

所以我對此持開放態(tài)度，我們構(gòu)建了一個矩陣，而債券在雙向情形下都有對沖幫助。

Bouzali:The equity market has changed a lot over the past decade. And you have all these new types of capital, whether it's multi-strategy hedge funds, retail investors, systematic players, ETFs.

布扎利：過去十年股票市場發(fā)生了巨大變化，出現(xiàn)了各種新型資本，無論是多策略對沖基金、散戶投資者、系統(tǒng)化參與者還是ETF。

How has that changed the time horizon that you feel you have edge versus, let's say, ten years ago? Are you more comfortable with the one-week, the one-month, the one-year trade? Or maybe it's not prescriptive. How do you think about that?

與十年前相比，這如何改變了您認為自己擁有優(yōu)勢的“時間跨度”？您是更傾向于一周、一個月還是一年的交易？或者這并非定式，您是如何思考這個問題的？

Stan Druckenmiller:Most trades I put on, I think in terms of 18 months to three years, that's how long I think they're probably going to evolve. Not every trade. You know, some are a year, some are five years. But I will admit that I've put on a three-year trade that five days later I'm out of and I've reversed.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：我建立的大多數(shù)頭寸，考慮的都是18個月到3年的時間跨度，因為這是我認為它們可能演化的周期。但并非每筆交易都如此，有些是一年，有些是五年。但我必須承認，我曾建立過一個三年的頭寸，但五天后我就清倉并反手做空了。

But, if you're talking about how I conceptualize it, all this noise about how much the system in the market has changed, that has not changed what I just said at all.And, the violence that creates is more useful for entry points if it goes against what my belief over the given time frame is.

但是，如果你問我如何進行思考的，關(guān)于市場系統(tǒng)發(fā)生巨大變化的那些噪音，完全沒有改變我剛才說的那套邏輯。而這種系統(tǒng)變化產(chǎn)生的波動性，如果它偏離了我在特定時間框架內(nèi)的信念，反而更有利于入場。

So, I think it's a lot of noise that makes my life annoying, because I'd rather just have nice, calm markets that move in a direction.But also, it creates opportunities and you have to use the volatility as opposed to being abused by the volatility other than mentally, which I'm going to be.

所以，我認為這些噪音讓我的生活變得很煩人，因為我更希望市場能平穩(wěn)地朝著某個方向移動。但同時，它也創(chuàng)造了機會，你必須利用波動，而不是被波動性所傷害——除了精神上的傷害，這是難免的。

But I mean, you can't let yourself be a victim of volatility and you can take advantage of it. It's just hard mentally.

我的意思是，你不能讓自己成為波動的受害者，你可以利用它，只是這在心理上很難。

Bouzali:But you said, I'd rather have trending markets. Fair. Am I wrong in sometimes thinking you're more comfortable being contrarian? Or do you embrace the consensus more? How do you think about that?

布扎利：但您說過您更喜歡趨勢明確的市場。我覺得您在做逆向投資時更舒服，是我錯了嗎？還是您其實也擁抱共識？您是怎么想的？

Stan Druckenmiller:Ithink contrarianism is overrated.Soros used to say the crowd's right 80% of the time. You just can't be caught in the other 20% because you can get your head handed to you.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：我認為逆向投資被過度神化了。索羅斯曾說，大眾在80%的時間里是對的。你只是不能被困在剩下的那20%里，因為那會讓你身首異處。

I get some intellectual satisfaction out of playing in the 20%, but as a concept, I think contrarianism is overrated.I do like it when I have extreme conviction and no one else believes it. It gives me even more conviction.

我在參與那20%的交易時確實能獲得某種理智上的滿足感，但逆向投資作為一個概念，我認為它被高估了。我確實喜歡那種我擁有極強信心但其他人都沒有的時刻，因為這會進一步堅定我的信念。

I don't care if a trade is crowded, if I think the thesis is right and the trend is with me. I mean, for entry points I care, but I don't really care in terms of the investment. It doesn't bother me.

但我并不在乎一筆交易是否擁擠，只要我認為邏輯正確且趨勢在我這一邊。我的意思是，我會在意入場點是否擁擠，但就投資本身而言，我并不在乎，這不會困擾我。

Bouzali:We had an investor zoom call in December 2022, and we were discussing macro, rates, dollar, US versus the rest of the world.

布扎利：2022年12月我們曾有過一次投資者視頻會議，當時我們在討論宏觀、利率、美元以及美國與世界其他地區(qū)的對比。

And after we spoke a little bit, I asked you what you think on rates. And I will quote essentially verbatim what you said. You said I couldn't care less about rates—the only thing that matters is AI and Nvidia.

在我們聊了一會后，我問您對利率的看法，我現(xiàn)在幾乎可以逐字引用您的原話。您當時說：“我一點也不關(guān)心利率——唯一重要的事情是AI和英偉達。”

Stan Druckenmiller:I don't remember that, but that's nice.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：我不記得了，但這話說得真漂亮。

Bouzali:What was going on? How did you see it?

布扎利：當時是什么情況？您是怎么預見的？

Stan Druckenmiller:So, the Nvidia story is quite interesting and it's a perfect example of the process we spoke about earlier, where I rely on other people. So, I have some young superstars in my firm. And they had a network and they started really talking about AI.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：英偉達的故事非常有趣，它完美體現(xiàn)了我們之前提到的投資流程，即我依賴于他人。我的公司里有一些年輕的超級明星，他們有自己的網(wǎng)絡(luò)，大約在22年初，他們開始真正深入談論AI。

This was in early- to mid-‘22, and then I started noticing that the kids at Stanford were shifting from crypto, 50/50 crypto and 50/50 AI to more going to AI.And that's something we've always looked at in venture is where the kids are going.

然后我開始注意到，斯坦福大學的孩子們正在發(fā)生從50%關(guān)注加密貨幣、50%關(guān)注AI，轉(zhuǎn)向更多地投身AI。天才年輕人的流向是我們在風投領(lǐng)域一直關(guān)注的指標。

When we bought Palantir in ‘08, ‘09, it was because that was a cool company back then that all the kids wanted to go to. So, my partner had in people from his AI network in there in Palo Alto. They came in and explained AI. Most of it went over my head, but I knew that this was really big.

我們在2008、2009年買入Palantir，就是因為那是當時所有的孩子都想去的酷公司。我的一位合伙人在帕羅奧圖（Palo Alto）有他的AI網(wǎng)絡(luò)，并邀請他們過來讓他們解釋AI，大部分內(nèi)容我都聽不懂，但我知道這會是一場巨變。

Bouzali:Why did you feel it was really big? It could have been a fad. You didn't feel this way for other fads.

布扎利：為什么您覺得這是一場巨變？它本可能只是曇花一現(xiàn)。您對其他熱潮可沒這種感覺。

Stan Druckenmiller:Because I had total trust in my partner, and I thought I was grasping the enormity. It turns out I wasn't grasping the enormity because I didn't know about large language models, but I knew about all the other conventional stuff that was going on in AI.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：因為我完全信任我的合伙人，而且我覺得自己抓住了它的影響力。事實證明，其實我當時并沒有真正理解其深遠意義，因為那時我還不知道大語言模型，但我了解AI領(lǐng)域正在發(fā)生的所有其他常規(guī)進展。

So, I said to my partner, what should I buy? He said Nvidia—that's the way to play AI. So just on this, about as much as you just heard, I bought a not-big position in Nvidia, but enough to get hurt on or to make some money on.

所以，我問我的合伙人：“我該買什么？”他說：“英偉達——那是布局AI的不二法門。”所以就憑這些，大概就像你剛才聽到的這么多信息，我買入了英偉達，倉位不算大，但足以產(chǎn)生盈虧影響。

And then about two weeks later, ChatGPT happened, which had not mentioned in our conversation.Well, even I understood, okay, the enormity of what that meant when I saw even the rudimentary things it was doing back then. So, then I doubled the position.

大約兩周后，ChatGPT問世了，而我們在之前的對話中根本沒提過。好吧，即便是我，當時在看到它能做的那些基礎(chǔ)功能時后，也理解了這意味著什么。于是，我將倉位翻倍了。

And then one of the great services you and Morgan Stanley provide are these macro calls and, um, all the macro guys, including myself, luckily I hadn't talked yet, were espousing their views on the world—which are probably worth a nickel and a cup of coffee.

后來，你們摩根士丹利提供了一項非常棒的服務，就是這些宏觀研討會。當時所有的宏觀分析師，包括我在內(nèi)（幸運的是當時還沒輪到我發(fā)言），都在闡述各自對世界的看法——這些看法可能也就值五分錢加一杯咖啡。

And an analyst there who was from the tech world said, ‘You guys are in the trees and you're missing the forest. There's something much bigger than anything you're talking about, even for macro.’ And, he went on to amplify everything I had heard three weeks ago or four weeks ago about AI.

而現(xiàn)場有一位來自科技界的分析師說：“你們都是只見樹木不見森林，現(xiàn)在正發(fā)生著比你們談論的任何事情都要重大的變革，即便對宏觀領(lǐng)域也是如此。”接著，他開始詳盡闡發(fā)我三四周前聽到的關(guān)于AI的一切。

But this time I had ChatGPT between that conversation and him. So, then I doubled my position again.

但那一次，在那次對話和他發(fā)言之間，我已經(jīng)體驗過ChatGPT了。于是，我又一次加倍了倉位。

And literally, I don't think I knew how to spell Nvidia three months before and when the stock took off, I knew through years of experience, when you have massive, massive change, investors just can't make themselves keep up with it. And it was funny because the person who knew ten times more than anybody at the table and probably 50 times more than me about AI, he sold his Nvidia shortly thereafter.

真的，我想三個月前我甚至都不知道英偉達怎么拼，但當股價起飛時，我憑借多年的經(jīng)驗知道，當這種極其重大的變革發(fā)生時，投資者往往跟不上節(jié)奏。有趣的是，那個對AI的了解比當時席間任何人多十倍、可能比我多五十倍的人，此后不久就賣掉了他的英偉達。

But I knew that this stock would go up for at least 2 or 3 years and go up a lot. And I said publicly in an interview about five months later, as, I cannot possibly see myself selling Nvidia over the next 2 or 3 years because it had already gone from like 150 to 390. And this person couldn't believe I still owned it. And I basically said, not only do I own it, the way these things evolve, this stock can't not go up for at least three years.

但我知道這只股票至少會漲兩三年，而且漲幅會非常巨大。大約五個月后，我在一次采訪中公開表示，我無法想象自己在未來兩三年內(nèi)賣掉英偉達，因為當時它已經(jīng)從150美元漲到了390美元。那個人簡直不敢相信我還持有它。我回應道，我不僅持有它，而且根據(jù)這類事物的演化規(guī)律，這只股票在未來三年內(nèi)不可能不漲。

So then the stock goes to 800 and I violated everything I said in the interview. I couldn't stand success. I'd gone from 150 to 800. I was long term in it. I couldn't deal with it, and I sold it. And then it was 1,400 like five weeks later and I was sick. But, um, it's amazing how little I knew about Nvidia. I couldn't even tell you what the earnings were.

隨后股價漲到了800美元，我違背了自己在采訪中所說的一切。我無法直視這種成功（賺錢效應）。股價從150漲到了800，我本該長期持有的，但我受不了了，把它賣了。結(jié)果五周后它就漲到了1400美元，我簡直都要吐血了。但是，令人驚訝的是，我對英偉達其實知之甚少，我甚至都說不出它的收益具體是多少。

Bouzali:It's a sign of confidence. And it's because you're Stan Druckenmiller that you can be so blatantly honest about the way you think about these things.

布扎利：這是一種自信的表現(xiàn)，正因為你是斯坦·德魯肯米勒，你才能對這些想法如此坦誠。

And I think it's very encouraging to portfolio managers that are coming up in the business, and they often feel like they need to be intellectually, very much on their game constantly. What I'm getting from this, the ability to filter, to manage, instead of being wedded to a spreadsheet is really unique and quite helpful.

我認為這對那些正在成長的投資組合經(jīng)理們非常有啟發(fā)，他們往往認為自己在智力上必須時刻保持巔峰狀態(tài)。我從中學到的是，這種篩選信息和管理團隊的能力，而不是死守著一張Excel表格，這個經(jīng)驗非常獨特且極有幫助。

You said something, that you violated what you had said and sold at 800. Would you have done that 20 years ago? Is this a sign of a more mature way of trading now versus before?

你提到你違背了之前的承諾，在800美元賣掉了。如果在20年前，你會這么做嗎？這是否意味著現(xiàn)在的交易方式比以前更成熟了？

Stan Druckenmiller:Probably not. I'm not used to making six times for my money in an equity in two years, and I'm not Warren Buffett. I think I would have screwed it up 20 years ago when I was good to

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：可能不會。我不習慣在兩年內(nèi)在一只股票身上賺到六倍的收益，我畢竟不是沃倫·巴夫特。我覺得即便是在20年前巔峰狀態(tài)的時候，我也一樣會把這筆交易搞砸。

Bouzali:What are some things—if there are some things that you have unlearned over the past 20, 30 years or you had to unlearn?

布扎利：在過去二三十年里，有哪些東西是你已經(jīng)拋棄的，或者不得不強迫自己忘記的？

Stan Druckenmiller:I don't unlearn anything because scars are something I always keep in mind because they can help you out.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：我不會“忘記”任何東西，因為那些“傷疤”是我需要始終銘記的，它們能幫我避坑。但我得說，由于一系列我不想贅述的情況，我被提拔得太早了。我23歲就成了分析師，26歲就成了首席投資經(jīng)理，而且我沒讀過商學院，所以在分析方面，我從未系統(tǒng)學習過所有必備的基本面知識。

So, I relied heavily—and my mentor was really into it, and back then nobody was doing it—on technical analysis and I learned all the intricate details of it. Okay. I can unequivocally tell you that technical analysis is about 20% as effective today as it was then, because no one was using it.But when everybody is using it, it doesn't work anymore because you don't have a unique thing to act against.

因此，我當時嚴重依賴技術(shù)分析（我的導師非常推崇這個，而當時沒人做這個），并且掌握了其中的所有復雜細節(jié)。現(xiàn)在，我可以明確地告訴你，技術(shù)分析在今天的有效性只有當年的20%，因為現(xiàn)在每個人都在用。當所有人都在用的時候，它就不再靈驗了，因為你不再擁有可以作為對手盤的獨特優(yōu)勢。

So, it's kind of sad because it's easy and you can be lazy. You don't have to work that hard. You just look at a chart instead of going into a 10Q and all this other stuff. But technical analysis is a problem.

這挺令人難過的，因為技術(shù)分析很省事，你可以變懶，不需要那么辛苦地去鉆研10Q報告之類的東西，看張圖表就行。但技術(shù)分析確實是個問題。

In the same vein, price versus heat news was huge for me for 20 or 30 years, and if you had great news and a stock wasn't responding to the news, 90% of the time the news was coming, that was bad.

同樣，在過去二三十年里，“價格與熱點新聞的背離”對我來說曾是一個巨大的信號：如果出了重大利好而股價沒有反應，那么接下來有90%的可能性會有重大利空。

Unfortunately, around 2000, a lot of smart people started coming into our business. I was the only one in my class, I think, from Bowdoin, that went into the financial industry, because we'd been in a bear market for ten years. Well, then again, every wise guy learned what I'm just talking about, so it doesn't work anymore.

不幸的是，大約從2000年開始，大量聰明人涌入了我們這個行業(yè)。我記得當年在鮑登學院，我是班里唯一一個進入金融行業(yè)的人，因為那時市場已經(jīng)低迷了十年。但后來，每一個聰明家伙都學會了我剛才說的這套邏輯，所以它也不再靈驗了。

So back then, the company reported horrible earnings, opened down in the aftermarket and then was up 10% the next day, almost guaranteed to be higher six months later. That's not true anymore because everybody else has learned that. So those would be the two big things. I haven't unlearned them, but I don't rely on them to the extent that I used to.

在過去，如果一家公司公布了糟糕的財報，盤后跳空低開，但第二天卻上漲了10%，這幾乎可以保證六個月后股價會更高。現(xiàn)在這種規(guī)律不再成立，因為大家都知道了。所以這就是兩大改變，我沒有忘記它們，只是不再像以前那樣依賴它們了。

Bouzali:They've been loved to death, basically. Are there any other signals that have been elevated in importance then, conversely to signals that have been diminished?

布扎利：大概是它們被濫用了這種意思。那么，相比于這些重要性下降的信號，有沒有什么信號的重要性提升了？

Stan Druckenmiller:Not really. There's no silver bullet. And I'm the great beneficiary of 40 years of scars and successes that I can go back on, and a lot of pattern recognition, because there's not much I haven't seen in this business.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：并沒有，沒有什么靈丹妙藥。我是這40年傷疤與成功的受益者，我可以回看過去，利用大量的模式識別，因為在這個行業(yè)里我沒見過的事已經(jīng)不多了。

I'd say the biggest disappointment in my career has been, I think I have more wisdom, and I have more tools of the trade than I had in my 30s and 40s, and I was a much better portfolio manager then because back then I had courage. I would take bigger convicted positions. I'm trying to regain some of my nerve just because it's more fun.

我職業(yè)生涯中最大的遺憾是，雖然我覺得現(xiàn)在的我比三四十歲時更有智慧、掌握的工具更多，但那時的我是一名更優(yōu)秀的投資組合經(jīng)理，因為那時候我有勇氣，我敢建立更大、更有信心的頭寸。我現(xiàn)在正試圖找回那種膽識，因為那很有趣。

Bouzali:So you're chickening out?

布扎利：所以你現(xiàn)在變膽小了？

Stan Druckenmiller:Oh for sure. I've been chickening out for a long time. I'm Mr. TACO, except it's not T, it's DACO. Druck Always Chickens Out.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：噢是的，我已經(jīng)變膽小很久了。我是TACO先生，只不過這個T要換成D，也就是DACO（Druck Always Chickens Out，德魯肯總是臨陣退縮。

Bouzali:In terms of other maybe experiences that you've had, or a chip on your shoulder? Do you have a chip on your shoulder that makes you better at this?

布扎利：談談你的其他的經(jīng)歷吧，或者是你身上那種“不服輸?shù)膭蓬^”？你是否有某種執(zhí)念讓你在這一行做得更好？

Stan Druckenmiller:No, no, I just, um, grew up—my dad and my sisters played games with me all the time. I was just a really sore loser. I love games, but I really hate to lose, so I'm just very driven.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：不，沒有，我只是……在成長過程中，我父親和姐妹們總是和我一起玩游戲。我是一個輸不起的人，我熱愛游戲，但我真的討厭輸，所以我非常有動力。

It's a sickness. I don't know where it comes from, but I might as well channel it and make it productive instead of just a disease because it is a little bit unseemly. But it's who I am.

這是一種病，我不知道它從何而來，但我最好還是引導它，讓它產(chǎn)生生產(chǎn)力，而不是任由它發(fā)展成一種病態(tài)，因為這確實有失風度，但這就是真實的我。

Bouzali:Embrace it. Finally, this show is called Hard Lessons. Can you look back in your life or career and maybe take us through something that you had to learn the hard way?

布扎利：擁抱它吧。最后，由于我們這個節(jié)目叫「hard lessons」，所以你能回顧一下你的生活或職業(yè)生涯，讓我們了解一下你通過艱苦方式學到的教訓嗎？

Stan Druckenmiller:Let me just say, I have so many scars. You can't believe it. Everyone knows how I played the Nasdaq melt up in ‘99. Sold it perfectly in January and then bought the exact top. And someone says, what did you learn from that? I said nothing, I learned not to do that 20 years before, but I got emotional, which I fight every day. I would literally like throw up like once or twice a week, just from anxiety when I'd have a drawdown and so forth.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：這么說吧，我身上的傷疤多得你無法想象。所有人都知道我在1999年是如何操作納斯達克暴漲的。我在1月份賣得非常完美，然后卻買在了最高點。有人問：“你從中學到了什么？”我說：“什么都沒學到。”早在20年前我就學過不要那樣做，但我還是變得情緒化了，這是我每天都要與之抗爭的東西。當出現(xiàn)凈值回撤等情況時，我真的會因為焦慮而每周嘔吐一兩次。

And at some point in my career, I learned that you're going to continue to make mistakes, you're going to continue to get emotional, you're going to continue to have that happen from now and then. But you've got a gift. And just stop torturing yourself for like 48 hours or maybe longer over this because you've been doing this long enough and the record is there long enough that it's no longer like random accident, which I did not believe for like 15 years.

后來在職業(yè)生涯的某個階段，我明白了一點：你會繼續(xù)犯錯，你會繼續(xù)變得情緒化，這些事情以后還是會時常發(fā)生；但你擁有一種天賦。別再為了這些事折磨自己48小時甚至更久了，因為你入行已經(jīng)足夠久了，你的業(yè)績記錄也足夠長，這說明成功已不再是隨機的偶然——而這一點在之前的15年里我是不相信的。

So, the hard lessons have been like hundreds of mistakes, but that they're just a moment in time. And when you have these drawdowns and if there's money managers listening to this and you're good, it's easier said than done. Just get over it and move on.

所以，所謂的“hard lessons”就是經(jīng)歷了成百上千次的錯誤，但它們只是時間長河中的一瞬間。如果有正在聽節(jié)目的基金經(jīng)理，而且你確實很優(yōu)秀的話，雖然說起來容易做起來難，但請挺過去，繼續(xù)前行。

Bouzali:So Stan Druckenmiller had imposter syndrome for 15 years?

布扎利：這么說，斯坦·德魯肯米勒也經(jīng)歷過15年的“冒充者綜合征”？

Stan Druckenmiller:Yes. Maybe longer.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：是的，可能更久。

Bouzali:Wow.

布扎利：哇。

Stan Druckenmiller:Maybe longer.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：可能更久。

Bouzali:Incredible. As we're finishing. I want to say thank you for being here. I got to know you later in your career, and it's just been fascinating to see you think and trade—to see you in action. You've been very generous with your time, and on behalf of Morgan Stanley, thank you very much.

布扎利：太不可思議了。在結(jié)束之際，我想說聲謝謝。我在您職業(yè)生涯的后期才結(jié)識您，觀察您的思考和交易、看您實操，真的是一件非常令人著迷的事。您非常慷慨地跟我們分享了許多，我代表摩根士丹利非常感謝您。

Stan Druckenmiller:As I said in the beginning, I wouldn't do this for many. And I think the world of Morgan Stanley, so it was delightful to be here.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：正如我開頭所說，我不會為很多人做這種訪談。我對摩根士丹利的評價極高，所以在這里聊得很愉快。

Bouzali:Thank you. Stan.

布扎利：謝謝，斯坦。

Stan Druckenmiller:Thanks, Iliana.

斯坦·德魯肯米勒：謝謝，Iliana。

Sean‘s take：https://t.zsxq.com/LvoAV

跨資產(chǎn)筆記：https://t.zsxq.com/i90xY

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